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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
Melvin Richardson was denied counsel for part of his state-
court sentencing. But neither his post-sentencing lawyer nor 
his state-habeas lawyer challenged that denial of counsel. Now, 
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on federal habeas, he seeks to challenge his post-sentencing 
lawyer’s ineffectiveness. 
To do so, he has to overcome both lawyers’ failures. He 
must attack his post-sentencing lawyer’s failure to raise the de-
nial of counsel as itself a denial of effective counsel. But he 
can do that only if he had a right to counsel at the post-sentenc-
ing stage. And, before attacking his post-sentencing counsel, 
he must attack his post-conviction-relief (state-habeas) law-
yer’s failure under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9, 17 (2012). 
But he can do that only if his post-sentencing lawyer was acting 
as trial counsel, rather than appellate counsel. 
We announce two holdings today: First, in Pennsylvania 
state court, the post-sentencing-motions stage is a critical stage 
at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of 
counsel. Richardson was denied that right because his post-
sentencing lawyer was ineffective. 
Second, the line dividing trial from appeal falls naturally at 
the notice of appeal. Post-sentencing motions precede the no-
tice of appeal, so they fall on the trial side of the line. Thus, 
when a state-habeas lawyer fails to raise a post-sentencing law-
yer’s ineffectiveness, the prisoner may raise that issue for the 
first time in his federal habeas petition. So Richardson’s inef-
fective-assistance-of-counsel claim is properly before us, and 
it is meritorious. We will thus remand for the District Court to 
grant the writ of habeas corpus and order a new sentencing 
hearing. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Pennsylvania State Court 
In 2003, Richardson and his son burgled two empty homes 
and fled from police. During a high-speed car chase, he 
rammed into a police car and crashed into a utility pole. He was 
prosecuted in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, 
Pennsylvania. A jury convicted him of burglary, criminal con-
spiracy, theft, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and flight 
from a police officer.  
Mid-sentencing, Richardson decided that he was dissatis-
fied with his lawyer and sought to fire him. The sentencing 
judge treated Richardson’s request as waiving his right to 
counsel. But the judge did not, as the Sixth Amendment re-
quires, question Richardson to ensure that his waiver was 
knowing and voluntary. And Richardson’s post-sentencing and 
state-habeas lawyers both overlooked this error. 
1. Joseph Green, Jr. (Trial and First Day of Sentencing). 
Richardson hired Joseph Green, Jr., as his lawyer for trial and 
sentencing. His sentencing took two days. On the first day, 
Green asked the court to schedule a psychological evaluation 
and postpone the sentencing hearing. The judge agreed and 
they reconvened a month later. 
At the start of the second day, Green told the court that 
Richardson had asked him to withdraw as counsel. The prose-
cution objected to Green’s last-minute withdrawal. Richardson 
replied that he “c[ould] represent [him]self” and that he “fe[lt] 
that Mr. Green d[id]n’t have [his] best interests at heart.” App. 
305. 
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The judge asked Richardson no questions about discharg-
ing Green. He simply observed: “You have competent counsel, 
and you will be foolish to terminate his services when he’s pre-
pared to proceed.” App. 310. The judge then gave an ambigu-
ous instruction: “I’m going to permit Mr. Green to leave, if he 
wants to leave, or to stay and stand by. But I’m going to pro-
ceed to sentence you today.” App. 311. At the prosecution’s 
suggestion, the judge purported to “keep [Green] here for now 
to protect your appellate rights at least.” App. 312. 
Green later testified that he “d[id]n’t know if [the judge 
had] granted the motion for leave to withdraw or not. . . . I was 
present, but I did not conduct [the second day of sentencing]. 
The extent to which someone or another concludes that I was 
representing Mr. Richardson is up to them to decide.” App. 
222. The sentencing transcript gives no hint that Green said or 
did anything further to protect Richardson’s rights. 
2. Pro Se (Second Day of Sentencing). The sentencing con-
tinued without any more participation by Green. Richardson 
spoke at length to the court, submitted letters and certificates 
from his employers, and called his fiancée to testify. The judge 
reviewed this new information, as well as Green’s earlier sub-
missions, and sentenced Richardson to 17½ to 39 years’ im-
prisonment followed by 10 years’ probation. 
3. Christian Hoey (Post-Sentencing Motions and Direct 
Appeal). The state court then appointed Christian Hoey to rep-
resent Richardson. At that stage, Hoey could file a post-sen-
tencing motion to reconsider Richardson’s sentence and then 
an appeal. Pa. R. Crim. P. 720(A), (B). 
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Hoey never challenged the sentencing judge’s failure to 
conduct a colloquy before letting Richardson proceed pro se. 
He did move to reconsider Richardson’s sentence on other 
grounds, but the sentencing judge denied that motion. Hoey 
then appealed the sentence, challenging it as excessive. But the 
Superior Court affirmed. 
4. Robert Brendza (State Habeas/PCRA). Richardson then 
filed a pro se state-habeas petition under Pennsylvania’s Post 
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Richardson’s handwritten pe-
tition and typed amendment expressly raised two right-to-
counsel claims. 
First, “[t]he trial Judge erred when he did not secure coun-
sel for the defendant during his sentencing, [d]enying [d]efend-
ant’s sixth amendment right to [c]ounsel.” App. 387. Richard-
son argued that, before letting a defendant represent himself, a 
“judge must conduct a penetrating and comprehensive inquiry 
of the defendant to ascertain whether he understands the nature 
of the charges against him, the permissible range of sentences 
to which he is exposed, the possible defenses to the charges 
and all the circumstances.” App. 399. But “[t]here was never 
any inquiry into whether the defendant was knowingly and in-
telligently waiving his right to counsel.” Id. 
Second, Richardson asserted that both his trial and appel-
late counsel had been ineffective, the latter by not raising argu-
able claims. App. 387. Richardson did not list the claims that 
Hoey should have raised, including the denial of counsel at 
sentencing. 
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The state-habeas court appointed Robert Brendza to repre-
sent Richardson. It also returned Richardson’s original and 
amended petition to him, saying that “whatever you needed to 
say needed to be raised by your attorney.” App. 410. The 
court’s instruction comported with Pennsylvania law, which 
tells courts not to consider pro se pleadings filed by parties who 
are represented by counsel (so-called “hybrid representation”). 
Commonwealth v. Reid, 642 A.2d 453, 462 (Pa. 1994); Com-
monwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Pa. 1993). 
Brendza abandoned Richardson’s sentencing-counsel 
claim. Instead, he argued that Richardson’s trial and appellate 
counsel were ineffective for not pursuing an evidentiary issue. 
But Richardson persisted, and at a hearing the state-habeas 
court let Richardson articulate his claims of ineffective assis-
tance of trial and appellate counsel and “judicial improprieties 
during [his] sentencing.” App. 412-13. At the court’s request, 
Brendza submitted a letter explaining why he thought Richard-
son’s sentencing-counsel claim was meritless. App. 457. 
The state-habeas court denied the petition, rejecting Bren-
dza’s claim as meritless. In keeping with Pennsylvania’s ban 
on hybrid representation, the court credited Brendza’s letter re-
jecting Richardson’s separate arguments, but did not discuss 
the sentencing court’s failure to question Richardson or the re-
lated ineffective-assistance claim. The Superior Court af-
firmed, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied leave 
to appeal. 
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B. Federal Habeas 
1. Federal Habeas Petition. Next, Richardson filed a ha-
beas petition pro se in federal court. He claimed that “Green 
was ineffective for abandoning [him] during the sentencing 
phase.” App. 54 (Claim I). He also claimed that “[t]he trial 
court erred by not performing an in depth on the record collo-
quy when petitioner released his retained counsel during sen-
tencing.” Id. (Claim J). And he claimed that “[a]ppellate coun-
sel Hoey was ineffective for not performing an independent in-
vestigation into the trial record to identify meritable issues for 
appeal and not briefing them to the court.” Id. (Claim M). He 
made the same claim against Brendza for not independently 
looking for and briefing meritorious issues on state habeas. Id. 
(Claim N). 
The magistrate judge recommended denying all claims. 
The District Court agreed and dismissed the habeas petition. 
We denied a certificate of appealability. 
2. Rule 60(b) Motion. Richardson renewed these claims in 
a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b). He argued that in Pennsylvania, defendants 
cannot raise ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims until 
state habeas, when there is no constitutional right to effective 
counsel. So he requested an evidentiary hearing to develop a 
record on his Sixth Amendment claims. 
The District Court again rejected Richardson’s arguments, 
and we again denied his request for a certificate of appealabil-
ity. But the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, 
and remanded for further consideration in light of Martinez. 
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On remand, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing. 
The three state-court lawyers relevant to this appeal all testi-
fied. As for sentencing, Green testified that he was unsure if 
the sentencing judge had granted his motion to withdraw from 
the case. As for post-sentencing motions, Hoey testified that he 
had reviewed the record and found no errors worthy of appeal. 
He also testified that he did not recall the issue of the sentenc-
ing court’s discharging Green and letting Richardson proceed 
pro se. As for state habeas, Brendza testified that, apart from 
one evidentiary issue raised in the state-habeas petition, his re-
view of the record had found no other issues that Hoey should 
have raised. 
The District Court again denied Richardson’s Rule 60(b) 
motion, and it is this opinion that we review here. Richardson 
v. Piazza, No. 2:07-cv-2065-PBT, 2015 WL 9273135 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 21, 2015). First, the District Court declined to entertain 
Richardson’s Sixth Amendment claim that the sentencing 
judge had failed to conduct a colloquy because it did not con-
strue the colloquy claim as an ineffective-assistance-of-coun-
sel claim. Id. at *3 n.5. 
Second, it reasoned that Green could not have been consti-
tutionally ineffective because Richardson could not prove that 
the lack of counsel prejudiced him. Because the prosecution 
presented no more evidence after Green withdrew, “there was 
nothing left for the trial court to do but impose its sentence.” 
Id. at *15. 
Third, the District Court rejected the claim against Hoey 
because it reasoned that Martinez’s equitable exception does 
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not extend past trial-counsel ineffectiveness to appellate coun-
sel. Id. at *16.  
Finally, it rejected the claim against Brendza. It reasoned 
that there is no constitutional right to counsel, and so no right 
to effective counsel, on state habeas. Id. 
We granted a certificate of appealability on one issue: On 
state habeas, Brendza failed to raise Hoey’s post-sentencing in-
effectiveness. Did Brendza’s failure to raise this ground for re-
lief excuse Richardson’s procedural default? If so, Richardson 
may now pursue his claim that Hoey was constitutionally inef-
fective because Hoey failed to argue, in his post-sentencing 
motion, that Richardson was denied his right to counsel at sen-
tencing. If not, his counsel’s procedural default bars this claim.  
To answer this claim, we must resolve two subsidiary ques-
tions: Did Richardson have a Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel for his post-sentencing motions? If so, does post-sentencing 
counsel qualify as trial counsel under Martinez? The answer to 
both questions is yes. 
II. FEDERAL HABEAS BACKGROUND 
These questions come to us by way of a federal habeas pe-
tition, and for the first time in this case, having gone un-
addressed at each stage below. Generally, when a litigant has 
failed to present his claims to the state court, the procedural-
default doctrine bars us from reviewing unpreserved claims. 
But there are exceptions to this rule. 
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A. Procedural default 
Federal habeas corpus is a backstop. It lets federal courts 
review the merits of federal claims in state criminal cases. But 
federal courts do not sit to review state law. So federal courts 
will not review federal claims when the state court’s decisions 
are supported by a state-law reason, an “independent and ade-
quate state ground[ ] .” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
729 (1991). 
One such ground is a violation of the state’s procedural 
rules. The federal habeas statute requires state prisoners to ex-
haust their state remedies before pursuing federal habeas relief. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). So when the state court denies a claim 
because the prisoner failed to comply with a procedural rule, 
that procedural default normally bars federal courts from re-
hearing the claim. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 
(2011). 
But a federal habeas court may excuse a prisoner’s proce-
dural default if the prisoner can show both cause for the default 
and resulting prejudice. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 
(1977). To show cause, he must explain what prevented him 
from timely raising the defaulted claim. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is one such cause: an “ob-
jective factor external to the defense” that can excuse proce-
dural default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 
When the state prosecutes, convicts, and imprisons a defend-
ant, it must ensure that the defendant “ha[s] the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. If the state 
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provides no lawyer or an ineffective one, it violates that obli-
gation. No state may “conduct trials at which persons who face 
incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal 
assistance.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. If the state violates this 
rule, its violation is cause to excuse the defendant’s procedural 
default. 
B. Layers of Ineffectiveness 
1. Ineffective lawyers challenging ineffective lawyers. 
Sometimes, there are several layers of ineffective lawyering. 
But when a prisoner has multiple opportunities to challenge an 
error, each time he fails to do so is a procedural default. And 
each default must be excused before we will review the merits 
of his claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-52 
(2000).  
For Richardson, this means that he must first show that 
Brendza’s failure to raise Hoey’s ineffectiveness was itself in-
effective, thus excusing the default on state habeas. Only then 
can he go on to show that Hoey’s failure to challenge the denial 
of counsel at sentencing violated the Sixth Amendment. 
One twist complicates this labyrinth even more. Pennsylva-
nia instructs inmates to bring ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claims on state habeas, not on direct appeal. Grant, 813 A.2d 
at 737-38. That is because a habeas court is better able to de-
velop the record needed to assess counsel’s performance and 
prejudice. Id. at 737. But on state-habeas review, there is no 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. 551, 555 (1987). So even if a state-habeas petitioner has 
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an ineffective lawyer, or no lawyer at all, the state has not vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment. 
If not remedied, this would set up a Catch-22: When the 
prisoner eventually filed a federal habeas petition, he would be 
told that he could not rely on his state-habeas lawyer’s bad law-
yering to excuse that procedural default. And that procedural 
default would then prevent our review of the effectiveness of 
trial counsel. Thus, “no court [would] review the prisoner’s 
claims.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10-11. 
Here, at the second half of sentencing, Richardson had no 
lawyer. After sentencing, Hoey did not challenge the sentenc-
ing judge’s failure to question Richardson before letting him 
proceed pro se. Direct appeal is not the proper forum to chal-
lenge Hoey’s ineffectiveness in Pennsylvania, so no state court 
would review these claims until state habeas. On state habeas, 
Brendza rebuffed Richardson’s own efforts to raise these 
claims. If these failures procedurally barred his claims on fed-
eral habeas, no court would ever review them. 
2. Martinez’s equitable exception to procedural default. To 
prevent this outcome and preserve claims of trial-counsel inef-
fectiveness, the Supreme Court carved out a “narrow excep-
tion” to procedural default. Id. at 9. Martinez permits prisoners 
to bring their claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
on federal habeas even if their state-habeas counsel failed to 
raise that claim. Id. So even though the right to counsel does 
not extend to state-habeas proceedings, the lack of effective 
counsel there does not prevent prisoners from later raising the 
ineffectiveness of their trial counsel. 
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Martinez’s equitable exception applies to states that require 
prisoners to await state habeas to raise ineffective-assistance 
claims. Id. at 17. It also applies to states, like Pennsylvania, 
whose procedures do not strictly bar earlier review but typi-
cally do not afford an opportunity to raise ineffective-assis-
tance claims until state habeas. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 
413, 429 (2013). 
3. The line between trial and appeal. By its terms, Martinez 
limited its equitable exception to prisoners challenging the in-
effectiveness of their trial counsel. 566 U.S. at 17. The Su-
preme Court later declined to extend Martinez’s exception to 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Davila v. 
Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2065 (2017). 
Davila distinguished trial-counsel ineffectiveness from ap-
pellate-counsel ineffectiveness on two main grounds. First, tri-
als are the heart of our criminal-justice system. Criminal trials, 
unlike appeals, are twice guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. at 
2066 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 & amend. VI). At trial, “the 
stakes for the defendant are highest” and “the trial judge or jury 
makes factual findings that nearly always receive deference on 
appeal and collateral review.” Id. 
Second, the Court expected that the “number of meritorious 
[ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel] cases [would be] 
infinitesimally small.” Id. at 2070 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). If appellate counsel ineffectively failed to raise an ar-
gument that had been preserved for appeal, then the trial court 
would have necessarily already addressed the alleged error, en-
suring that at least one court considered the claim on the merits. 
Id. at 2067. And if the error had not been preserved for appeal, 
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the appeal would ordinarily fail anyway. Id. So it would be 
hard to show on habeas that appellate counsel’s failure to raise 
an unpreserved argument influenced the outcome. 
In sum, Martinez lets prisoners who challenge the ineffec-
tive assistance of their trial counsel on federal habeas excuse a 
procedural default by their state-habeas counsel. But prisoners 
who want to challenge the ineffectiveness of their appellate 
counsel on federal habeas cannot turn to Martinez. The initial 
question presented here is whether post-sentencing counsel 
counts as trial or appellate counsel under Martinez. 
III. MARTINEZ ’S EQUITABLE EXCEPTION ENDS AT THE 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Trial courts impose sentences and hear post-sentencing mo-
tions before the notice of appeal takes effect. Are these actions, 
after the trial or plea but before the appeal, better categorized 
as the province of trial counsel or appellate counsel? We hold 
that the boundary between trial and appellate counsel falls at 
the effective date of the notice of appeal. So Martinez’s equi-
table exception to procedural default extends to post-sentenc-
ing counsel. 
The notice of appeal marks the traditional line between trial 
and appellate review. In federal court, “[t]he filing of a notice 
of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers 
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court 
of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the ap-
peal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 
58 (1982). 
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So too in Pennsylvania. “[T]he general rule [is] that the fil-
ing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction.” 
Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d 994, 1001 (Pa. 2011). 
Thus, defendants may not file notices of appeal while their 
post-sentencing motions are still pending. Pa. R. Crim. P. 720 
cmt. Timing; cf. Cooper, 27 A.3d at 1004-08 (recognizing two 
exceptional circumstances that can delay the effective date of 
the notice of appeal, neither of which is relevant here). 
The notice of appeal thus moves a proceeding from one 
court to another. Counsel direct their arguments to the appel-
late court, not the trial court. Their goal is not to change the 
trial judge’s mind, but to persuade the appellate panel to over-
turn the lower court’s decision. And counsel no longer build 
the record but parse it, crafting legal arguments that are limited 
by objections made below.  
Sentencing and post-sentencing proceedings also differ cat-
egorically from appeals. Counsel direct sentencing and post-
sentencing arguments to the same trial court, usually to the 
same judge. Counsel may also develop the record by proffering 
new evidence, which the trial court may hear at an evidentiary 
hearing. See Commonwealth v. Perrin, 108 A.3d 50, 54 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2015); see also id. at 51 (explaining that newly dis-
covered evidence on appeal “must be raised promptly . . . and 
should include a request for a remand to the trial judge” (quot-
ing Pa. R. Crim. P. 720 cmt. Miscellaneous)). 
The state, however, asks us to draw the line when the trial 
court orally pronounces the defendant’s sentence. It argues that 
this is when the error-correcting stage begins. But it cites no 
authority for drawing the line then. And doing so would make 
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little sense. To begin, the defendant’s sentence is not yet fixed. 
“[U]ntil the trial court disposes of the [post-sentencing] mo-
tion” or the time for doing so passes, there is not yet a final 
judgment. Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 159 & 
n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). Defendants can still challenge their 
verdicts and sentences, and the state can still seek to modify 
the sentence. Pa. R. Crim. P. 720(B)(1)(a), 721. So the bound-
ary between trial and appellate counsel naturally falls not at the 
oral sentence, but at the notice of appeal. 
Drawing the line at the pronouncement of sentence would 
also prevent any court from reviewing meritorious claims like 
Richardson’s. Many states do not entertain ineffective-assis-
tance claims on direct appeal. And since defendants do not 
have a right to effective assistance on habeas, the state’s line 
would prevent state and federal courts from ever looking at 
meritorious ineffective-assistance-of-post-sentencing-counsel 
claims.  
That is the same concern that animated Martinez’s equita-
ble exception for trial counsel. So under Martinez’s reasoning 
about the availability of review, we draw the line between trial 
and appeal at the time of an effective notice of appeal. 
Because post-sentencing motions fall before the notice of 
appeal, Hoey qualifies as trial counsel under Martinez. So 
Richardson may pursue Martinez’s equitable exception for his 
claim that Hoey was ineffective.  
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IV. MARTINEZ’S EXCEPTION APPLIES HERE 
Martinez’s exception can excuse Richardson’s procedural 
default of his claim that his post-sentencing counsel was inef-
fective—but only if he shows three things. To qualify for Mar-
tinez’s exception, a habeas petitioner must show (1) that the 
procedural default was caused by either the lack of counsel or 
ineffective counsel on post-conviction review; (2) that this lack 
or ineffectiveness of counsel was in the first collateral proceed-
ing when the claim could have been heard; and (3) that the un-
derlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is 
“ ‘substantial.’ ” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14). Richardson satisfies all 
three. 
A. Post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the 
procedural default 
Brendza refused to pursue Richardson’s claim that Hoey 
was ineffective. By failing to do so, he was ineffective. This 
first prong of Cox requires the same showing as the first prong 
of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): defi-
cient performance. Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 
No. 16-3095, 2018 WL 4212055, at *7 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2018). 
A showing of prejudice is also required, but that occurs at 
Cox’s third prong, discussed below.  
Brendza should have seen that the sentencing judge erred 
in not conducting a colloquy and that Hoey erred in not chal-
lenging the judge’s oversight. By not raising that issue, Bren-
dza performed deficiently. 
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1. The sentencing judge failed to conduct a colloquy. The 
sentencing judge did not conduct a colloquy before letting 
Richardson waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at 
sentencing. Defendants may waive that right only after the 
court questions the defendant to ensure “that the waiver of 
counsel is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.” United States 
v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1995), superseded in ir-
relevant part by rule as recognized in United States v. Turner, 
677 F.3d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 2012). The colloquy need not be a 
“rote dialogue” nor “as exhaustive and searching as a similar 
inquiry before the conclusion of trial.” Id. at 219-20. But it 
must be “a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy [the judge] 
that the defendant’s waiver was understanding and voluntary.” 
United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1982). 
Here, the sentencing judge asked no questions at all. He 
merely admonished Richardson that he was “foolish to termi-
nate [Green’s] services.” App. 310. The failure to conduct any 
colloquy was a legal issue that Hoey should have raised in his 
post-sentencing motion. 
2. Brendza’s performance was deficient. Brendza per-
formed deficiently on state habeas. Under Strickland’s first 
prong, Richardson must show that his lawyer “fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing pro-
fessional norms.” 466 U.S. at 688. A lawyer performs defi-
ciently when “there is simply no rational basis to believe that 
counsel’s failure to argue the . . . issue on appeal was a strategic 
choice.” United States v. Mannino, 212 F.3d 835, 844 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing as an example a case in which a lawyer “fail[ed] 
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to raise [an] obvious and potentially successful sentencing . . . 
issue”). 
As noted, the sentencing judge conducted no colloquy be-
fore letting Richardson proceed without counsel. That failure 
was clear and apparent on the face of the sentencing transcript. 
So was Hoey’s failure to raise that issue. Brendza’s failure to 
challenge Hoey’s ineffectiveness cannot be justified as a tacti-
cal decision. Brendza testified that he had reviewed the record 
and found no error, at least not in that regard. Indeed, even after 
Richardson himself challenged Hoey’s ineffectiveness in his 
pro se state-habeas filing, Brendza filed a letter arguing that 
Richardson’s claim was meritless. Richardson had nothing to 
gain and much to lose by Brendza’s disavowing his claim. By 
missing this substantial, obvious issue, Brendza performed de-
ficiently. 
B. Brendza was ineffective in Richardson’s first collat-
eral-review proceeding 
Brendza failed to raise the issue in his PCRA (state-habeas) 
petition. That was Richardson’s first collateral-review oppor-
tunity to raise the claim. So Richardson has satisfied the second 
prong of Cox as well. 
C. Richardson’s underlying claim of trial-counsel inef-
fectiveness is substantial 
Under the final Cox prong, Richardson must show that his 
underlying claim of Hoey’s ineffectiveness is “substantial.” 
757 F.3d at 119 (quoting Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14). In other 
words, he must show that “the claim has some merit,” as re-
quired for a certificate of appealability. Id. A claim has merit 
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so long as “reasonable jurists could debate” its merits, or it “de-
serve[s] encouragement to proceed further.” Preston, 2018 WL 
4212055, at *8 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 
336 (2003)). Though Strickland’s two-step analysis is a guide, 
we must “remain mindful that the ‘substantiality’ inquiry ‘does 
not require full consideration of the factual or legal bases ad-
duced in support of the claims.’ ” Id. And Richardson need 
show only that his ineffective-assistance claim against Hoey, 
his trial counsel, is substantial. This proof of substantiality is 
also enough to show prejudice resulting from the ineffective-
ness of Brendza, his state-habeas counsel. He need not make 
any additional showing of prejudice, as Strickland would re-
quire. See Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI, No. 16-
1969, 2018 WL 4324238, at *5-6 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 2018). 
So substantiality is a notably lower standard than the proof 
of prejudice required by Strickland’s second prong. Id. at *5. 
In a case with a less-developed factual record, a petitioner 
could qualify for the Martinez exception and possibly an evi-
dentiary hearing even if he did not yet have enough evidence 
to prove prejudice under Strickland. 
Here, Richardson’s underlying ineffective-assistance claim 
is substantial. It is more than arguable that he had a right to 
effective post-sentencing counsel. (In the next part, we con-
clude that he did indeed have that right.) And as explained 
above, the sentencing judge failed to conduct a conduct a col-
loquy to ensure that Richardson’s waiver of counsel at sentenc-
ing was knowing and voluntary. That error was apparent on the 
face of the record, but Hoey did not pursue it. Hoey performed 
deficiently. 
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Because Hoey’s deficiency was “clearly substandard under 
the first prong of Strickland, we need not concern ourselves 
with the prejudice prong of Strickland in order to satisfy Mar-
tinez and excuse the procedural default.” Preston, 2018 WL 
4212055, at *8 (suggesting but not deciding whether a less-
clear case of deficient performance might require more proof 
of prejudice). So Richardson satisfies the third and final prong 
of Cox as well. 
To prevail on the merits of his habeas claim, Richardson 
must go on to show that his post-sentencing counsel, Hoey, 
was ineffective under the full Strickland test. But before he can 
do so, he must first show that he had a constitutional right to 
post-sentencing counsel at all. 
V. RICHARDSON HAD A RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT THE POST-
SENTENCING STAGE 
Richardson had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel post-
sentencing. That is the basis for his substantial ineffective-as-
sistance-of-post-sentencing-counsel claim. The Supreme 
Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a 
“right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process.” 
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004). That right extends 
beyond trial to sentencing. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 
(2012). But the Court recently declined to decide whether there 
is a right to counsel to file a post-sentencing motion. Marshall 
v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 61 (2013). And we have never ad-
dressed the issue.  
23 
We now hold that, in Pennsylvania state court, post-sen-
tencing motions are a critical stage under the Sixth Amend-
ment. So defendants have a right to counsel at that stage. 
A. Critical stages  
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant “the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence” “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. But the right is limited to the 
critical stages of the prosecution—those when the defendant 
faces “significant consequences” and “the guiding hand of 
counsel” is “necessary to assure a meaningful ‘defence.’ ” Bell 
v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 (2002); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 69 (1932); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 
(1967). 
Many pretrial proceedings count as critical stages, because 
courts need defense counsel to ensure the reliability of trial ver-
dicts. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 (1981) (pre-
trial psychiatric examination); Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37 (pre-
trial lineup); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 
(1964) (post-indictment interrogation); Hamilton v. Alabama, 
368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961) (arraignment). 
On the other hand, pretrial steps that do not turn on lawyerly 
knowledge or skills are not critical stages. So, for instance, de-
fendants have no right to counsel when police show witnesses 
photo arrays. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317-18 
(1973). Because photo identifications involve no adversarial 
confrontation or technical legal knowledge, defendants do not 
need legal expertise then. Id. at 313, 318. 
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The right to counsel protects more than just trial verdicts. It 
also protects plea bargaining, in part because poor bargaining 
can lead to heavier sentences and deportation. Lafler, 566 U.S. 
at 163-66; Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143-44 (2012); Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). And it protects 
sentencing because “ ‘any amount of [additional] jail time has 
Sixth Amendment significance.’ ” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165 
(quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001)). 
Defendants have a right to counsel to protect them from over-
punishment as well as from wrongful conviction.  
The right to counsel at sentencing also helps to preserve le-
gal rights for review. For instance, in Mempa v. Rhay, the Su-
preme Court reviewed Washington’s deferred-sentencing pro-
cedure, in which defendants faced a sentencing judge only after 
they violated a term of probation. 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967). It 
held that deferred sentencing was a critical stage because “cer-
tain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at this stage.” Id. 
at 135. If defendants lacked counsel then, the Court noted, they 
could lose their right to appeal. Id. at 136. 
B. In Pennsylvania, post-sentencing motions are a criti-
cal stage 
The critical-stage inquiry may vary from state to state, de-
pending on how states choose to configure their criminal pro-
cedures. Pennsylvania courts treat Pennsylvania’s post-sen-
tencing, pre-appeal motions as a critical stage. Commonwealth 
v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 297 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (explaining 
that defendants are “constitutionally entitled to counsel” during 
“the post-sentence and direct appeal period”); Commonwealth 
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v. Dozier, 439 A.2d 1185, 1190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (recog-
nizing the right to counsel at sentence-reconsideration hear-
ings). Though these state decisions do not bind us, we agree 
with them. 
In Pennsylvania, defendants may face severe consequences 
if they fail to file post-sentencing motions. These motions give 
trial judges a second chance to review their decisions before 
appeal, and even to admit new evidence. Pa. R. Crim. P. 
720(C). Some motions are optional. If a defendant raised an 
issue before or at trial, that issue is preserved for appeal even 
without a post-sentencing motion. Id. R. 720(B)(1)(c). But mo-
tions addressing the “discretionary aspects of a sentence,” like 
motions to reconsider or modify the sentence, must be raised 
at or after sentencing. Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 663 A.2d 790, 
791-92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). “[C]ounsel must carefully con-
sider whether the record created at the sentencing proceeding 
is adequate,” or else “the issues may be waived” on appeal. Pa. 
R. Crim. P. 720 cmt. Miscellaneous. 
In short, in Pennsylvania, defendants need counsel’s legal 
expertise and skills to protect their right to challenge their sen-
tences post-sentencing. So the Sixth Amendment requires ef-
fective counsel at that critical stage. 
VI. RICHARDSON’S POST-SENTENCING-COUNSEL CLAIM 
IS PROPERLY BEFORE US 
Next, the state asserts that Richardson did not preserve his 
claim. But he did. This is true particularly because we must 
read pro se pleadings charitably, especially when litigants are 
imprisoned. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) 
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(per curiam); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 
244-45 (3d Cir. 2013). 
Richardson’s habeas petition “specif[ied] all the grounds 
for relief available to the petitioner” and “state[d] the facts sup-
porting each ground.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, R. 2(c); 
accord Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005). In his federal 
petition, Richardson’s Claim J expressly challenged the trial 
court’s failure to “perform[ ]  an in depth on the record colloquy 
when petitioner released his retained counsel during sentenc-
ing.” Am. Fed. Habeas Pet. Mem. 3. Claim I challenged 
Green’s “ineffective[ness] [in] abandoning his client during the 
sentencing phase.” Id. Claims M and N challenged Hoey’s and 
Brendza’s failure to find and preserve meritorious issues. Id. at 
3-4. 
Read together with Claim J, Richardson’s ineffective-coun-
sel claims include counsel’s failure to challenge the trial 
judge’s lack of questioning. Richardson even raised the collec-
tive effect of “layered ineffective assistance of counsel, prose-
cutorial misconduct, and judicial error.” Id. at 2. And his Rule 
60(b) motion reiterated his layered-ineffectiveness claim. 
The state’s only response is that Richardson’s pro se plead-
ings referred to Hoey as appellate counsel, not post-sentencing 
counsel. But that labeling is not dispositive. Regardless of the 
labeling, the District Court and the state were both on notice of 
Richardson’s claim. 
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VII. RICHARDSON LACKED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL POST-SENTENCING 
To recap: Richardson qualifies for Martinez’s exception to 
procedural default. He had a right to counsel post-sentencing. 
And he has preserved his claim. All that remains is to consider 
the merits of Richardson’s underlying claim that his post-sen-
tencing counsel was ineffective. So now, Richardson must 
show that Hoey was ineffective for not raising the trial court’s 
failure to conduct a colloquy before letting him proceed with-
out counsel on the second day of his sentencing. 
He has done so. Hoey was ineffective, and Richardson suf-
fered prejudice, because Hoey did not challenge the sentencing 
judge’s failure to question Richardson. 
At this stage, Richardson must satisfy the full Strickland 
standard, not the abridged version used at the Martinez stage. 
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Richardson must 
show both that Hoey performed deficiently and that, as a result, 
Richardson suffered prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
Both prongs are satisfied here. 
A. Deficient performance  
As explained in Part IV.C, Hoey’s post-sentencing perfor-
mance was deficient. The sentencing judge had failed to con-
duct a colloquy to ensure that Richardson had knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel at sentencing. That error 
was apparent. Hoey should have raised the issue, but he never 
even saw it. 
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B. Prejudice 
Richardson must also prove that Hoey’s deficient perfor-
mance prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. He has. 
Richardson asserts that we may presume prejudice because 
the sentencing judge’s error was structural. Structural errors in-
clude completely denying counsel to a defendant at a critical 
stage. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). 
“[W]e have characterized defective waivers [of counsel] as 
structural errors.” United States v. Booker, 684 F.3d 421, 428 
(3d Cir. 2012). On the other hand, Richardson did not com-
pletely lack counsel throughout sentencing. He had Green’s 
representation on the first day of sentencing, though not the 
second. 
We need not decide whether the error was structural. Re-
gardless, it was prejudicial. The District Court disagreed, rea-
soning that the sentencing judge would have imposed the same 
sentence anyway. Richardson, 2015 WL 9273135, at *15. It 
stressed that the prosecution adduced no more evidence or tes-
timony on the second day of sentencing, so “there was nothing 
left for the trial court to do but impose its sentence.” Id. But 
that is not the correct test. 
The test of prejudice is not whether the judge would have 
imposed a different sentence, but “whether we would have 
likely reversed and ordered a remand had the issue been raised 
on direct appeal” or post-sentencing motion. Mannino, 212 
F.3d at 844. Had Hoey challenged the failure to conduct a col-
loquy, either on appeal or by post-sentencing motion, the 
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proper remedy would have been to order a new sentencing 
hearing. So his failure prejudiced Richardson. 
VII.  REMEDY 
Richardson has navigated each twist of the habeas laby-
rinth. His ball of thread leads past Martinez’s equitable excep-
tion, past Brendza’s rejection of his argument, past Hoey’s 
oversight, to the sentencing judge’s colloquy at the heart of the 
maze. So Richardson has overcome every hurdle and we may 
review the merits. See Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 
F.3d 230, 244 (3d Cir. 2017). Because the state court did not 
review the merits, we review de novo. Id. at 236. 
For the reasons discussed above, Richardson had a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel on the second day of sentencing. 
But the sentencing judge let him proceed pro se without first 
questioning him to ensure that he was intelligently and volun-
tarily waiving that right. And Hoey provided ineffective assis-
tance by not challenging that error post-sentencing and pre-
serving it for appeal and habeas corpus. Hoey’s error preju-
diced Richardson. So we will reverse and remand for the Dis-
trict Court to grant Richardson’s writ of habeas corpus, limited 
to ordering a new sentencing hearing. 
